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   There is a growing literature identifying social capital as a significant factor in national, 
regional, and community growth.  Social capital is thought to generate an institutional 
environment that cultivates economic growth.  Social interactions give rise to trust, the capacity 
for collective action, and information exchanges.  If these social externalities persist, in time they 
shape the economic environment of the region.  Thus, social capital works to create the 
economic institutions that are “the rules of the game” which govern the distribution and use of 
resources within society (North).  
  While institutional economists have advocated the importance of institutions for 
economic development for several decades, the dominance of neoclassical theory has steered 
economists away from much investigation into this relationship.  Neoclassical theory pays little 
attention to institutions and treats them primarily as effects rather than causes of economic 
growth.  However, with the emergence of social capital theory (Collier, Woolcock, Coleman), 
much progress has been made in understanding why social capital impacts economic growth.  
Social capital has been used to explain the success of endogenous development strategies 
(Kraybill and Weber, Barkley), to provide a rationale for public policies aimed at preserving 
rural places (Castle), and to account for the benefits of community networks in economic 
development (Malecki).  
Many rural development practitioners understand, at least implicitly, the link between 
social capital and economic development, as demonstrated in their emphasis on community self-
reliance and endogenous development.  Such techniques emphasize the coordination of 
information and resources among community organizations to improve the business and 
residential environment of the region.   3
In this paper, we seek to address empirically how social capital affects economic growth.  
Like previous empirical studies on this relationship, we use a conditional convergence growth 
model that includes proxies of social capital.   Unlike other studies, however, our social capital 
proxies are network centrality measures computed from a unique dataset containing 
organizational networks from 18 rural, US communities.  The following section describes our 
proxies for social capital.  A discussion of the conditional convergence growth model follows.  
Then, we present our data and results.  The paper concludes with anticipated extensions to this 
research project and future uses of the data. 
Proxying Social Capital 
  Physical capital is observable, and the production process of human capital is understood 
so that proxies for these variables can be identified.  But social capital is neither observable nor 
adequately understood, so defining proxies is difficult.  Malecki chooses not to define social 
capital directly, but rather notes that it cannot be created by an individual’s choice.  Social capital 
is the establishment of commonly held customs or virtues of a group.  Castle goes a step further 
and requires social capital to increase the productivity of a group such that the group’s 
productivity is greater than the sum of that of the individual members. Collier focuses on both 
the social and capital aspects of social capital.  Collier argues that social capital is generated 
when an externality caused by social interaction has a persistent impact.  The persistence can 
manifest itself as the result of repeated interactions (e.g., market transactions with the same 
seller), or prolonged effects from an initial interaction (e.g., establishment of a structure, like a 
park or bar, to facilitate interactions).   
Collier defines a taxonomy of social capital that highlights the relationship between 
social interaction and social capital outcomes.  Two features of this taxonomy are particularly   4
noteworthy.  First, the taxonomy links different forms of interaction to different forms of social 
capital.  Second, the taxonomy identifies various consequences and sources of social capital.  
Woolcock argues that proxies for social capital should emphasize its source rather than its 
consequences, because the inputs into social capital are more easily identified than social capital 
and its consequences.   
Collier suggests measures of social interaction to be the appropriate proxy for social 
capital, and his taxonomy enables the researcher to isolate the social capital of interest by 
choosing the appropriate form of social interaction to model.  While social capital is 
unobservable and nonexcludable in nature, the process by which it is created is the opposite.  
Social interactions are observable and quantifiable, and so measures of social interactions are 
natural proxies for social capital stocks.  Paldam affirms this suggestion and proposes network 
density as a legitimate instrument.  Noting that network analyses provide rich data on social 
interactions, Paldam also points out that the impact of such interactions is often not comparable 
between contexts due to inconsistencies in network measurement.  This, coupled with the cost of 
collecting network data, has left this proxy relatively untouched by economists in favor of 
Putnam’s social capital instrument because it can be computed from secondary data.  Putnam’s 
instrument measures the average number of organizations to which a person belongs in a given 
region (or equivalently, the average membership of organizations in a region).  For examples of 
how this instrument can be used to explain per capita income growth see Nayaran and Pritchett, 
Rupasingha, Goetz and Freshwater, and Knack and Keefer. 
  Following Collier´s suggestion that measures of social interactions are logical proxies for 
social capital and Paldam’s recommendation of network density as a proxy, we use network 
centrality diagnostics to measure social capital.  Network centrality measures summarize the   5
level of interactions within a network.   Freeman defines network centrality as an index of the 
tendency of each agent to be more `central´ than all other agents in the network.  A central agent 
is characterized by either a high level of interaction with other agents (called the degree of 
centrality and measured as a function of the number of other agents to which an agent is 
connected), a high probability of linking any pair of agents (referred to as betweenness), or being 
close  to all other agents in the network (closeness is determined by the number agents found 
between two agents).  Each of Freeman’s centrality measures captures a different aspect of social 
capital:  
•   degree centrality can be interpreted as measuring the opportunities for information 
exchange that lead to building trust within a community; 
•   betweenness centrality measures the potential to control/filter information that facilitates 
collective action; 
•   closeness centrality reflects the efficiency of information dissemination that decreases 
transaction costs. 
So degree, betweenness and closeness centralities will be considered in our analysis.  In addition, 
network density (the number of actual linkages between agents, or relations, in the network 
divided by the number of potential relations in the network) will be computed.  Potential 
relations can be interpreted as a measure of potential interaction in a community, where higher 
values indicate greater interaction and higher potential for social capital formation. 
The Conditional Convergence Growth Model 
We incorporate our proxies into a conditional convergence growth model, based on 
neoclassical growth theory.  The conditional convergence growth model explains economic 
growth of regions as a function of economic conditions in a previous period and structural   6
differences between the regions that might cause the growth paths to converge or diverge 
(Barro).  Intuitively, different endowments represented by initial income and capital stocks 
clearly affect economic growth, but differing political or social environments could also affect 
economic growth.  So, control variables in addition to initial income, and labor and capital stocks 
are also included to control for these structural differences between regions.  The model assumes 
that economic growth is an autoregressive process such that the growth rate is a function of the 
initial state of the economy and the conditioning variables. 
The previous literature examining the social capital–economic growth relationship uses 
the conditional convergence growth model to test hypotheses regarding the existence and 
strength of the relationship.  Often, the relationship is assumed to be linear, so that the model can 
be easily estimated using ordinary least squares.  Generally, the estimated function takes the 
following form: 
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  We have selected a number of variables as proxies for the regressors in the model above.  
For capital stocks, education level is used to measure human capital and assessed property values 
are a proxy for physical capital stocks.  Other sociological and political variables included are 
municipal expenditure, labor force participation rate, rural/urban classification, average property   7
tax millage, and transportation accessibility to the municipality.  The social capital proxies are 
the network centrality measures and network density as discussed earlier. 
  Our expectations for these variables are as follows.  Higher capital stocks, greater 
highway accessibility, higher government expenditures, lower tax rates, higher quantities of 
labor, and urban/urban-fringe location are expected to induce faster, positive growth.  In 
addition, higher values of the centrality measures/network density should induce faster growth. 
There is a potential problem of causality since our network data is measured at the end of 
the period under scrutiny.  It is conceivable that per capita income growth could influence social 
capital levels, given our data.  A Wu-Hausman test will be used to test for the exogeneity of the 
social capital proxies.  Endogeneity of the network measures would suggest that the network has 
changed over the period of investigation.  To correct for this endogeneity problem, we will 
include a structural variable that measures change in age composition for each community 
between 1990 and 2000.  Changes in age composition should capture significant shifts of the 
social network within the community (e.g., increase in social activity due to an influx of baby-
boomers) and are intended to control for network change. 
Data Requirements 
  The data for the analysis will come from various sources.  The data for income, education 
and labor supply come from the 1990 and 2000 US Censuses (we will extrapolate per capita 
income from 2000 to 2002 to maintain consistency between our social capital proxies and 
income growth).  Two highway access variables are tried:  shortest distance in miles by road to 
an interstate highway exchange, and the number of interstate highway exchanges present in the 
county in which the municipality is located.  Both measures are obtained from state department 
of transportation maps for 1992.  Per capita total municipal expenditures and per capita total   8
capital outlays are taken from the 1992 United States Census of Governments.  Average property 
tax millage rate on commercial, industrial, mineral and public utility and total assessed value of 
non-residential real estate property are from appropriate state agencies.  The rural-urban 
continuum codes for all United States’ counties are available from the Economic Research 
Service (US Department of Agriculture). 
The network centrality and density measures are computed from surveys of organizations 
in 18 small, rural communities (12 in Ohio, 6 in Iowa) collected in 2002 and 2003.  The survey, 
developed by Kilkenny and Nalbarte, asks the respondent to identify local organizations to or 
from which it (1) gives or receives funds, (2) gives or receives information, and (3) gives or 
receives political/organizational support (each topic represents a separate question).  
Respondents are presented with a list of all identifiable businesses, non-profit organizations and 
government institutions in their community.  Questions regarding the three types of flows (funds, 
information, support) are worded identically for each community.  The aim is to make the data 
consistent across communities and suitable for cross-sectional analysis.  The communities were 
selected from a list of municipalities in each state with population less than 3,000 in 2000 to 
ensure that the entire geography of the state was represented in the sample.  Response rates in 
each community exceeded 60%. 
Survey responses are recorded in one of six graphs – one for each direction of interaction 
(give/receive) for each of the three type of flows.  We added the directional graphs (network 
terminology for matrix) for each flow together to mitigate the selection bias that arises from non-
response.  Once the graphs were added, the resulting graph was recoded so that if a relation 
between two organizations was mentioned on either directional graph it received a value of 1, but   9
if no relation (value = 0) existed in either directional graph no relation is recorded in the resulting 
graph.
1 
  There is an additional difficulty introduced into the model when using network data.  
Relations between organizations can take two forms:  directional (i.e., one agent interacts with 
another, but the second agent does not reciprocate interaction; e.g., lecturing students is an 
asymmetric transfer of information), and reciprocal (i.e., the agents interact with each other for 
mutual gain; e.g., a market transaction).  Directional and reciprocal relations map uniquely into 
two types of response graphs:  asymmetric and symmetric.  Asymmetric graphs contain elements 
that reflect directional interactions, whereas the elements of symmetric graphs correspond to 
reciprocal interactions.  Survey data is asymmetric in nature, since the responding parties do not 
collaborate when filling out the response forms and differences will occur in responses.  The 
researcher must then decide whether or not symmetry is a valid assumption to impose upon the 
data.  
We chose to evaluate the network centrality measures under both asymmetric and 
symmetric assumptions.  On one hand, the asymmetric responses in our study communicate the 
respondent’s perception of his/her relationships with other organizations in the community.  
Given the unobservable and subjective nature of social capital, perception may have profound 
implications for its measurement and flow.  For example, different perceptions of interactions by 
organizations within a community will affect how central agents in the network are relative to 
one another, so the centrality measure will be significantly higher or lower than if no perception 
difference existed.  On the other hand, it seems reasonable that when organizations interact there 
is mutual benefit, and so the relations should be symmetric.  However, imposing symmetry could 
                                                 
1 Adding the directional graphs and recoding the resulting graph provides a larger number of relations (because it 
captures how the respondents interact with non-respondents) than if we just considered the directional graphs 
independently.   10
assume too much.  Take a case where two agents interact in a producer-supplier relationship, and 
say that only one agent acknowledges the relationship in his response to the flow of funds 
question.  Imposing symmetry in this situation merely captures market transactions and not 
social capital since, in general, market transactions cannot generate social capital.
2  Since we 
have no a priori information about the networks in our analysis, we calculate the network 
centrality measures under both assumptions.  As such, two sets of results will be presented for 
our model.  The first set relies upon asymmetric network data, while the second set uses 
symmetric network data.  (The network centrality measure based upon closeness requires the 
symmetry assumption, so it is not calculated under the asymmetric data assumption.) 
  Some of the surveys have taken longer to collect than initially anticipated.  
Unfortunately, there is not enough variation in per capita income growth of the 12 communities 
we have to generate meaningful results.  Consequently, we do not have empirical results at this 
time, though we expect to have data from a second state in time to estimate the model for the 
meetings in July.   
Results 
  Two econometric problems may appear when the model is actually estimated.  First, 
previous studies examining the relationship between economic growth and social capital have 
found heteroskedasticity in the estimated models.  We will test for this and utilize generalized 
least squares if this condition exists.  Second, because of our small sample size relative to the 
number parameters to be estimated, our parameter estimates may not be stable (i.e., they may 
change dramatically as the sample is varied).  We will use influence diagnostics to test that the 
parameter estimates are stable for the sample as a whole (Besley, Kuh and Welsch).  In addition, 
                                                 
2 It is assumed that producer-consumer transactions do not create social externalities (i.e., agents capture the full 
benefits of trade within the transaction).  By definition social capital is an externality generated by social 
interactions, and therefore it cannot be generated by market relationships.   11
we will utilize factor analysis to generate two indices of community characteristics to provide 
controls for factors that affect the convergence process and yet minimize the number of 
parameters to be estimated in the model.  One index focuses on government characteristics and 
services (government index), such as education and per capita expenditures.  The other index 
consists of labor force participation rate and the distance to an interstate highway interchange 
(economic index). 
Conclusions 
   We anticipate that social interactions, and hence social capital, will be positively related 
to per capita income growth, consistent with the findings of Narayan and Pritchett and 
Rupasingha, Goetz and Freshwater.  Such results will lead us to conclude that network centrality 
measures are adequate proxies for social capital.  In addition, we expect to find that asymmetric 
data fit the model better than will symmetric data.  The policy implications are evident, if the 
hypothesized social capita—economic growth relationship is supported:  increasing the 
coordination of financial resources and information among local organizations can lead to 
positive economic growth. 
  One highly desirable extension to this project would be to increase the number of 
observations (communities).  Funding is being sought to develop a database containing survey 
responses and demographic, economic and sociological data on an additional 102 communities 
in an additional 8 states.  The survey data utilized in this project would also be useful in 
examining the factors that affect social capital accumulation and flows.  We intend to develop a 
social capital generation model for this purpose.  Such a model would be analogous to 
investment models that explain why individuals choose to invest or divest in physical or human 
capital.  It would provide a much needed framework in the social capital literature to explain   12
how social capital forms/deteriorates, and it would assist in prescribing policies affecting 
individual behavior toward social capital investment.   13
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